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Abstract 
Current literature identifies wide-ranging predictors for populist and 
conspiratorial sentiment like nativism, economic inequality, social isolation, and other 
mental health issues.  This paper presents an empirical analysis investigating how 
COVID-19 non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) measures affected far-right populist 
sentiment in the United States.  This study conducts logit regression using American 
National Election Studies (ANES) data from 2016 and 2020 to make the novel assertion 
that hopelessness and pride are both strongly associated with populist sentiment.  It also 
reveals that other socioeconomical and political factors have greater influence than 
COVID-19 social restrictions.  Logit regression of state-level data suggests that lifting 
NPI measures decreases feelings of anxiety and depression, feelings that prior research 
associates with being more vulnerable to extreme sentiment.  These findings both 
compliment and contradict current literature and, despite this study not presenting 
causations, it does provide a theoretical framework for future analysis. 
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The capitol attack on January 6, 2021, will serve as a watershed moment in 
American history.  At the time of this study, scores of researchers and analysts are 
investigating what conditions in the population contributed to the attack.  Leading 
political figures at the time had been propelled into office, at least partially, through the 
support of far-right populists.  Understanding the traits associated with this way of 
thinking can inform policies that uproot its leading causes.  Presented in this study is a 
comprehensive approach at codifying and measuring far-right populism in the United 
States through empirically measuring the conditions most likely to predict it, while also 
presenting a theoretical framework for calculating how many may hold it. 
1.1 What do we mean when we say far-right populism? 
 Populism itself is a rather elusive term as there are various definitions describing 
it, many with negative connotations.  This paper uses Cas Mudde’s definition, “An 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonist groups ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” 
(Mudde 2004, 543; definition found via Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 150, italics 
in original).  All populism is inherently Manichaean in that there are two mutually 
exclusive sides where “the people” are engaged in a struggle with the governing elites 
who seek to “undermine the rightful sovereignty of the common folk” (Oliver and Rahn 
2016, 190).  Specifically, far-right populism has three distinctive traits:  it discursively 
generates threats to the nation, it accuses the governing class of betraying the people in 
favor of those threats, and, finally, it portrays itself as the rightful defender of the virtuous 
common folk against the evil elites (Bergmann 2018, 12).   
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1.2 The Far-Right Populism-Conspiracy Theory Nexus 
Far-right populists create and propagate conspiracy theories to promote their own 
agendas and to energize their support base (Bergmann 2018, 3).  Populism and 
conspiracy theories share key characteristics.  First, both propose that the true meaning 
behind tragic events is obscured by a few, powerful elites, where the unwitting people are 
actively being plotted against by a secret group (Wood 2019).  Second, both share a 
similar duality in views of the world by discursively asserting the existence of threats to 
the in-group (Bergmann 2018, 169).  Additionally, populism is inherently political, 
whereas, conspiracies may be apolitical (Bergmann 2018, 170).  In this sense, populism 
is naturally conspiratorial, but some conspiracies may not always support populist 
ideologies. 
 Conspiracy theories prove to be convenient ways to simply explain complex 
events or ideas.  Many right-wing conspiracies have centered around a deep-state of 
bureaucrats and politicians secretly controlling society. (Bergmann 2018, 4).  Conspiracy 
theories have an inherent self-sealing quality because they often overestimate the powers 
of certain agents and are unlikely to give credence to fact-checking or debunking 
because, as the theory argues, such efforts are likely on behalf of the nefarious agents 
themselves (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 207).  Often, conspiracies overestimate the 
competence of government officials to conduct sophisticated, covert plans despite 
contradictory evidence that open society governments rarely keep secrets long term 
(Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 208).1   
                                                          
1 A 2016 study mathematically argued that there was an inverse relationship between the number of people 
required to keep something secret and how long before the secret was uncovered i.e., the more people who 
know about a secret, the less time it will remain hidden (Grimes 2016). 
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Research by social psychologists have determined that there is a relationship 
between conspiratorial thinking and one’s mental health.  Social exclusion, lacking 
control, and perception of threats have all been shown to increase a person’s chances of 
subscribing to conspiracy theories.  A 2016 study determined that feelings of social 
exclusion were positively associated with endorsements of conspiratorial beliefs 
(Graeupner and Coman 2016).  Another study demonstrated “the need to be and feel in 
control is so strong that individuals will produce a pattern from noise to return the world 
to a predictable state” (Whitson and Galinsky 2008, 117).  As such, conspiracy theorists 
see illusory patterns by attributing intentional action to otherwise inexplicable events, 
rejecting the possibility that catastrophes sometimes happen by chance (Sunstein and 
Vermeule 2009, 208).  This kind of self-deception can be a result of perceived threats.  
One article determined through multiple case studies that people become more prone to 
endorsing superstitious beliefs during times when perceived threats are greatest i.e., 
during the Great Depression (Sales 1973, 48, 53).  Although political ideology remained 
absent from these studies, they lay the foundation for understanding how the COVID-19 
pandemic could have exacerbated feelings of social isolation leading many to feel no 
control over their own lives. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
This study seeks to understand how conditions resulting from the COVID-19 
pandemic influenced far-right populism in during the 2020 U.S. presidential election.  
Populism entered the national dialogue in 2016 to explain how the Republican-candidate, 
Donald Trump, won the presidential election.  As a result, researchers continue to analyze 
the growing role populism plays in current American politics and its association with 
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misinformation, disinformation, and conspiracy theories (Oliver and Rahn 2016; 
Bergmann 2018).  As COVID-19 spread across the country in the months leading up to 
the election, many states instituted varying non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) 
measures from shutting down social events to mandating masks to strict lockdowns 
whereby more and more Americans spent time socially excluded from each other.   
Scholars have studied populism and the pandemic (Vieten 2020; Eberl, Huber, 
and Greussing 2020), populism and the role of the internet (Bimber 1998; Krämer 2017; 
LaFree et al. 2016), the populism-conspiracy theory nexus (Bergmann 2018), and how 
social exclusion increases one’s vulnerability for believing conspiracy theories 
(Graeupner and Coman 2016; Whitson and Galinsky 2008).  Research presented here 
combines the elements of previous studies and advances the collective understanding on 
what affects populist sentiment both at the individual and state-levels.  It seeks to 
validate, in a unique and comprehensive way, the assertions that nativism, 
authoritarianism, education, and economic inequality all affect populist attitudes.  Like 
the 2016 election, the 2020 U.S. presidential election showcased populist sentiment in 
favor of President Trump; however, current literature remains limited on how the 
pandemic may have influenced that sentiment.  This paper posits the theory that stress on 
mental health resulting from COVID-19 NPI measures exacerbated populist sentiment.   
Multiple studies discuss security concerns associated with far-right groups.  
Eirikur Bergman warns of dangers associated with far-right populist conspiracy theories 
as they can “erode trust in society” and serve as a “catalyst for radicalization and 
extremism” (2018, 174).  Additionally, the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) published a study in 2016 asserting that 
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individuals on the far-right had a “strong and positive relationship to violence.”  Recent 
evidence suggests the internet likely sped up the radicalization process for members of 
the far-right (LaFree et al. 2016, 41, 75).  The security risks presented by far-right groups 
underpins the importance of learning how the global pandemic affected them. 
Populism itself falls along a scale encompassing both far-left and far-right ends of 
the political spectrum.  It is important to discuss this distinction here because 
understanding their differences determines how variables will be chosen and coded to 
measure the desired group.  The main difference is that the far-left typically focuses on 
socially underprivileged populations whereas the far-right typically focuses on the 
interests of ordinary citizens (Bergmann 2018, 74).  To help illustrate this difference, far-
left populism in Latin America is characterized by socialist movements lead by Bolivian 
President Evo Morales and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez characterized as 
inclusionary since these movements sought to improve the quality of life for the 
country’s most destitute (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 159).  Conversely, far-
right populism in Europe is considered exclusionary, characterized by nativist  
movements led by Jörg Haider in Austria or Jean-Marie Le Pen in France where 
discursive narratives pit in-groups against out-groups (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2013; Oliver and Rahn 2016).  This Manichaean form of political ideology is intrinsically 
intertwined with conspiracy theories that help to justify its radical claims. 
2.1 The COVID-19 Pandemic and Far-Right Populism 
Multiple studies (Vieten 2020; Eberl, Huber, and Greussing 2020) have 
investigated how the COVID-19 pandemic likely increased far-right sentiment.  One 
study conducted three months into the pandemic argued that far-right movements in 
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Germany were mobilizing as a result of COVID-19 restrictions and that self-isolation 
coupled with a reliance on online communication may have made more people 
susceptible to far-right propaganda (Vieten 2020).  A COVID-conspiracy theory survey 
of 660 adults showed that conspiratorial thinking was strongly related to broader 
conspiracy beliefs, more prevalent in individuals with less education, and had a positive, 
but weak, correlation with negative attitudes towards government NPI measures 
(Georgiou, Delfabbro, and Balzan 2020).  The results of the study did not reveal an 
increase in disinformation on alternative news sites but did discover that many added a 
populist spin to their content.  One can infer a relationship between the pandemic and far-
right populism, but literature on this relationship remains limited.  Studying this 
relationship could provide insights into how crises and widespread threats serve as 
catalysts for promoting far-right populism and dangerous conspiracy theories.   
2.2 Predictors of Populism 
To assess the affect COVID-19 NPI measures have on far-right populism, a 
thorough analysis needs to put the pandemic in context of other predictors.  Previous 
work on how education is associated with many socioeconomical factors provides insight 
into how it affects populism.  The right-wing nationalist populist movements that 
materialized in Europe during the 1970’s found support in the less educated working 
class to support their cause (Bergmann 2018, 74).  Further work into the topic argued that 
globalization and it associated advances in technology and education made the less 
educated more insecure in the labor market and, as a result, their place in society (Oliver 
and Rahn 2016, 192).  As this theory goes, “knowledge” societies require basic 
information processing skills that are continuously evolving thereby leaving the less 
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educated more vulnerable and insecure (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016, 
337).  Other research has suggested a link between insecurity and uncertainty with 
conspiratorial thinking (Grzesiak-Feldman 2013, 113) where the appeal of populism can 
take root.   
Nativism is also a trait often associated with populism.  Expanding on the 
previous paragraph, previous research has found correlation between lower levels of 
education and higher levels of ethnocentrism and lower tolerance for outgroups (Margalit 
2019, 159; Oliver and Rahn 2016, 191).  Research from the 1990’s also determined a link 
between lower levels of education and opposition towards immigration (Citrin 1997, 
874).  For these reasons, researchers have asserted that nativism is a key feature of radical 
right ideology, an idea linked to a nationalist construct (Mudde 2010, 1173).  In other 
terms, nativism implies an inherited entitlement to the common good of society, a 
distinctive trait of populism (Vieten 2020, 12).  With this body of research, nativism will 
serve as an invaluable control variable for measuring the impact COVID-19 had on far-
right populists during 2020. 
Authoritarianism has long been a predictor of populism.  Authoritarianism, as 
argued by Cas Mudde (2010), is a central component of far-right populist radicals 
representing the belief in a strictly ordered society where violations of authority deserve 
severe punishment.  What distinguishes these far-right radicals from earlier groups like 
fascists and Nazis who also favored authoritarian leadership is the acceptance of 
democracy (Bergmann 2018, 92) thereby representing more interest in the will of the 
people in politics.  Expanding further, previous research concluded that environmental 
threats is reliably associated with greater support for authoritarianism (Sales 1973).  In 
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this regard, COVID-19 represents the worst biological threat in over a hundred years and, 
based off this research, should show an increase in far-right populist sentiment in 2020 as 
compared to 2016.   
Previous research has also linked far-right ideologies to economic insecurity.  
This association draws upon previous research linking increasing income inequality to 
increasing social distances, exacerbating status differences within society (Pickett and 
Wilkinson 2015, 323).  Current literature has demonstrated a link between this kind of 
inequality and globalization (Heimberger 2020).  One study argued the emergence of 
political groups like far-right populists can be linked to the structural conflict between 
winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi 2006, 951).  Research has identified three 
consequences from this structural conflict:  increased economic competition, heightened 
cultural diversity, and increased political competition between the state and international 
organizations (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016, 337).  As a result, 
globalization increases income inequality by raising the real return on skilled labor and 
lowering the real return on unskilled labor (Heimberger 2020, 2963).  These unskilled 
labor groups who often consist of less educated workers fear competition from 
immigrants (Jay et al. 2019, 421; Margalit 2019; Spruyt, Keppens, and Van 
Droogenbroeck 2016, 344; Citrin 1997, 861) who can fulfill unskilled jobs at a lower cost 
to the employer.  For these reasons, measuring far-right populism in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic necessitates variables that also measure attitudes towards income 




3. Data and Methods 
This study uses multiple datasets to examine the conditions affecting far-right 
populist sentiment.  Two datasets came from the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) surveys from 2016 and 2020.  Since 1948, scholars have used these studies for 
analysis on public opinion and voting behavior in U.S. presidential elections.  The 2016 
study uses a dual-mode design with both traditional face-to-face interviews (n = 1,180) 
and online questionnaires (n = 3,090) for a total sample size of 4,270 respondents.  
Researchers collected pre-election data from September 7 to November 7 2016 with post-
election collection from November 9 to January 8, 2017 (American National Election 
Studies 2019)2.  The 2020 study was a preliminary release lacking some of the cleaning, 
processing, data, and variables of a usual full release of the dataset.  The study re-
interviewed respondents from the 2016 study, drew a new cross-sectional sample, and 
featured post-election respondents from the General Social Survey.  The study uses three 
modes for data collection:  web, video, and telephone (n = 8,280).  Researchers gathered 
pre-election data from August 18 to November 3, 2020 and then post-election collection 
from November 8 to January 4, 2021 (American National Election Studies 2021)3. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge in measuring an extremist ideology is that this study 
expects few people to identify with this thinking in casual settings and fewer in a formal 
survey.  Quantitatively testing cultural explanations for populism is equally difficult 
(Margalit 2019, 165).  To address the issue, this study generates a unique dependent 
variable from populist-related variables found in both datasets.  A good composite, 
dependent variable is one that includes a variable measuring belief in external threats to 
                                                          
2 The 2016 U.S. Presidential election was on November 8 
3 The 2020 U.S. Presidential election was on November 3  
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the nation, a variable measuring belief that domestic elites are acting contrary to the 
wishes of the people, and, lastly, a variable measuring the degree to which an individual 
sees his or herself as a protector of the people from perceived threats (Bergmann 2018, 
12). 
This study uses three variables found in both 2016 and 2020 surveys.  This study 
re-codes variables with a value of 1 representing answers that literature has associated 
with far-right populists; otherwise, the study codes unrelated answers as 0.  A value of 1 
represents if a respondent agreed to the statement, “America’s culture is generally 
harmed by immigrants,” otherwise the value is 0.  Many studies have linked anti-
immigration sentiment with populist attitude thereby validating its use in the dependent 
variable (Margalit 2019; Bergmann 2018; Oliver and Rahn 2016; Rudolph 2021).  The 
second variable has a value of 1 for respondents who agreed to the statement, “What 
people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles,” with the 
remaining responses having a value of 0.  Among the multiple survey questions asking 
respondent’s attitudes towards government corruption or governing elites, what 
distinguishes this variable is the assertion that compromise means forfeiting conviction.  
Conviction underpins many religious and political viewpoints but when taken in context 
of other variables, it can identify a specific subset of the population.  The last variable 
measures how important gun access is to respondents.  Those who think it is important 
have a value of 1, otherwise responses are 0 (American National Election Studies 2021).  
Because no survey question directly asked if a respondent saw his or herself as a 
protector of the people, this study uses a substitute measurement.  Using the premise that 
far-right populists would associate gun access with defending one’s rights, this study 
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considers the variable a logical stand-in.  After generating the dependent variable for both 
datasets, 432 far-right populists in 2020 (5.23% of sample size) and 324 respondents in 
2016 (8.23% of sample size).  Although the number of identified populists increased by 
108, the proportion decreased by 3% from 2016 to 2020.  One possible explanation for 
the decreased percentage is that President Trump’s policies towards immigration and 
refugee programs may have reduced anti-immigration sentiment, although further 
research is needed to test that hypothesis. 
This study explores three approaches analyzing ANES 2020 data with all being at 
the individual-level of analysis.  The first uses simple logistic regression comparing 
variables from both 2016 and 2020 datasets.  The regression analysis uses a total of nine 
independent variables as potential predictors.  Most predictors have binary values with 
values of 1 representing responses aligned with far-right populist sentiment.  These nine 
covered an array of items inspired by studies associating far-right populism with factors 
like economic insecurity (Margalit 2019; Jay et al. 2019), nativism (Vieten 2020; Oliver 
and Rahn 2016), and proclivity towards violence (LaFree et al. 2016; Bergmann 2018).   
The second approach also utilizes logistic regression analysis using variables 
unique to ANES 2020 survey, like online political activity and posting comments on the 
internet.  One variable measures if a respondent believes the conspiracy that a laboratory 
manufactured COVID-19.  Another variable measures whether a respondent thought 
COVID-19 NPI measures are too strict.  Those who thought the measures are too strict 
have a value of 1, otherwise the value is 0.   
The third approach uses logistic regression to analyze how a respondent’s 
emotional state influences far-right populist sentiment.  This approach uses 11 emotional 
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variables covering fear, anger, anxiety, and happiness, among others.  Research shows 
that anxiety may be more severe following major external events like natural disasters or 
terrorist attacks (Georgiou, Delfabbro, and Balzan 2020, 2).  This study treats the 
COVID-19 pandemic as analogues to a natural disaster. 
A fourth approach in this study uses state-level data from two additional datasets.  
One utilizes Household Pulse Survey data from the U.S. Census Bureau.  This survey is a 
partnership between the Census Bureau, National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and many other federal agencies 
to measure how the COVID-19 pandemic affected American citizens (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2021).  Data came from 20-minute online surveys conducted across three 
collection periods (at the time of this writing) starting on April 23, 2020 running through 
March 1, 2021 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2021; U.S. Census Bureau 
2021).  Data tables from the survey show the percentage of respondents who reported 
feelings of anxiety or depression aggregated at the state-level.  The second dataset uses 
New York Times information tracking NPI measures for each state, starting in April 2020 
(The New York Times 2020).  Collecting data one day a week every week from April 
2020 to January 2021, this dataset coded values from zero to two.  A value of two 
represents the most socially restrictive measures i.e., lockdown.  A value of one, or 
“some restrictions,” represents states that required mandatory mask wear and restricted at 
least some social gatherings like sporting events and indoor dining.  Zero represents 
states that did not mandate masks or opened enough social activities like nightclubs, bars, 
church services, and indoor dining, all activities that help to reduce social isolation.  Both 
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datasets included the District of Columbia and, as such, information for 51 states over a 
span of 41 weeks yields 2,091 observations. 
Figure 1.  National Average, Self-Reported Symptoms of Anxiety or Depression  
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey 2020-2021 
Note:  Survey data started April 23, 2020 and extends to March 1, 2021. 
 
This study combines both datasets before using logistic regression analysis to 
measure the relationship NPI measures have on feelings of anxiety and depression at the 
state-level.  The theory underpinning this analysis is that feelings of anxiety and 
depression from strict COVID-19 prevention measures could coincide with the emotional 




































percentage of respondents reporting symptoms of anxiety or depression disorder from 
April 2020 to March 2021.  The first spike in Figure 1 occurred in July 2020 during 
nationwide protests regarding racial equality and police accountability.  The highest value 
of 42.6% occurred between 11 and 23 November following the U.S. presidential election.  
Feelings of anxiety and depression remained high through January following the capitol 
attack before falling in March 2021 when COVID-19 vaccines started reaching larger 
sections of the U.S. population. 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Individual-level analysis using ANES survey data: 2016 vs. 2020 
The first statistical analysis examines the difference between 2016 and 2020 
ANES datasets to assess how COVID-19 affected far-right populist sentiment.  Figure 2 
compares the same variables from both datasets save the addition of the COVID-19 
variable.  The variable COVID-19, coded 1 to indicate feelings that prevention measures 
are too strict, does not have a significant relationship predicting far-right populism when 
included with other independent variables.  Alternatively, in a bivariate logit model 
depicted in green in Figure 2, feelings that COVID-19 NPI measures are too strict have a 
significant relationship predicting far-right populism.  The next variable, which measures 
ANES survey respondents who thought the country is on the wrong track, have opposite 
values from 2016 to 2020.  This is the only variable to have opposing values between 
both datasets.  In the 2016 model, feelings that the country is going in the wrong direction 
have a significant relationship predicting far-right populist sentiment, but then flips in the 
2020 model.  Party identification likely plays a large role in this discrepancy.  Far-right 
populists likely opposed many policies implemented by President Barrack Obama, a 
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Democrat, leading up to the 2016 presidential election.  Conversely, this same 
demographic likely supported the policies of President Donald Trump leading up to the 
2020 election. 
Figure 2. Comparison Between 2016 and 2020 Datasets at 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Source: 2016 & 2020 American National Election Study Time-Series Data 
Note:  The color lines represent each variable’s 95% confidence level.  The shape (circle, square, or 
diamond) represents the median value.  Variables whose lines do not cross the vertical dashed line 
have a significant relationship predicting far-right populist sentiment.  Variables whose entire 
confidence levels fall to the right of the dashed line have a positive relationship and to the left are 
negative.  See Table 1 in Appendix A for Figure 2 regression table. 
 
The next seven variables measure survey respondents self-reported political 
philosophies.  In both models, respondents who report being extremely liberal, liberal, or 
slightly liberal all have significant relationships rejecting far-right populist sentiment.  
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Being extremely liberal in 2020 is a weaker predictor of far-right populism than in 2016.  
Far-left populists during the pandemic might have accounted for the difference between 
models; however, scholars should further analyze this to make a more confident 
assessment.  From 2016 to 2020, self-reported moderates went from having no significant 
relationship with far-right populist sentiment to strongly opposing it.  Individuals who 
identified as only being slightly conservative have no significant relationship in 
predicting the dependent variable.  Self-reporting as either conservative or extremely 
conservative both have a significant relationship with the dependent variable.  One 
should expect such a relationship, but it also serves a dual purpose of validating how well 
the dependent variable represents the target demographic. 
Several variables measure different attributes research associates with far-right 
populism.  In both models, respondents who report having a high school education or less 
have a significant relationship predicting the dependent variable.  This result aligns with 
Spruyt, Keppens, and Droogenbroeck’s (2016) study where they also measured a strong 
relationship between the less educated and populism.  This study finds no relationship 
between using the internet in general and the dependent variable; however, the next 
analysis shows that specific online activity does have a relationship.  Feelings that 
economic mobility has worsened over the last 20 years has a strong relationship 
predicting the dependent variable for both 2016 and 2020 models.  This study applies the 
economic mobility variable as an indirect measure of economic insecurity and inequality.  
The results here support the conclusion made in previous research (Jay et al. 2019), 
which asserts a relationship between economic inequality and far-right populism.  
Conversely, and despite the pandemic, worry about finances have no significant 
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relationship in the 2020 model as compared to the 2016 model.  This study does not 
determine a clear explanation for the difference, although it is possible stimulus checks 
helped alleviate some concern about family finances.  Such an assertion requires more 
analysis, however.   
The final variables in this analysis also focus on the attributes research associates 
with populism.  Nativism in this study is a measure of the number of years a respondent 
has lived in his or her community rooted in the idea that the longer an individual lives in 
an area, the greater the chance of holding negative views towards immigrants or other out 
groups.  The absence of a relationship here contradicts the most prevalent literature on 
the topic (Mudde 2010; Oliver and Rahn 2016) thereby necessitating continued research 
into this relationship.  It could also mean that the variable used in this study was not an 
accurate measure of nativism.  Respondents’ attitudes towards strong leadership 
measures authoritarianism.  This study finds a strong relationship for both 2016 and 2020 
models.  Alternatively, it is unlikely many people would advocate having a weak leader 
in the White House but, in context of other independent variables, it contributes to the 
understanding of far-right populists.  The last variable measures the relationship between 
far-right populism and justification for using political violence.  Previous studies linked a 
proclivity towards violence with far-right ideologies (LaFree et al. 2016; Butt and Byman 
2020; Vieten 2020).  Here, such a relationship is absent.  With the ANES survey 
occurring around the time as nationwide protests where right-wing media sensationalized 




4.2 Individual-level analysis using ANES survey data unique to 2020 
Figure 3 shows the second statistical analysis using variables unique to the ANES 
2020 dataset.  Model 1 uses the same bivariate logistic regression as the COVID-19 NPI 
model from Figure 2 with similar results.  Attitudes that COVID-19 NPI measures are too 
strict only have a significant relationship with far-right populist sentiment when 
measured in isolation, disappearing with additional independent variables.  One of the 
strongest relationships with the dependent variable in this analysis is the perception that 
protests during 2020 were mostly violent as opposed to mostly peaceful or evenly split.  
Ambiguity in the question allows the respondent to recall the most salient protests rather 
than making the individual consider all protests over the year.  With this ambiguity, riots 
in major cities and peaceful protests that turned violent were likely easier to recall than 
peaceful ones.  Right-wing media also reported on violence surrounding the protests, 
meaning that more salient events likely had a greater impression on the respondent’s 
memory. 
The last few variables in this analysis include online activity and conspiratorial 
thinking, both of which research associates with populism (Vieten 2020; Krämer 2017).  
Online political activity has a strong relationship predicting the dependent variable.  
Positive values for this independent variable include respondents who affirmed to 
participating in online political activity like meetings, rallies, and similar events in 
support of a particular candidate.  Conversely, posting comments online about a political 
issue within the last 12 months does not have a significant relationship with far-right 
populism.  Again, the nature of the survey could have precluded respondents from 
admitting to this specific behavior, if assuming the respondent saw such an admission 
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with negative connotation.  Additionally, it could indicate that far-right populists use the 
internet in a passive way whereby it is used as a tool to retrieve information rather than a 
mechanism to engage in political discourse.  Under this premise, detecting far-right 
populists online becomes more difficult if the majority refrain from posting political 
comments.  As such, the observable far-right content online might only reflect the vocal 
minority, challenging efforts to discern the actual number of populists from other 
statistical means like content analysis.   
Figure 3. ANES Data Unique to 2020 at 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Source: 2020 American National Election Study Time-Series Data 
Note:  The color lines represent each variable’s 95% confidence level.  The shape (either circle or 
square) represents the median value.  Variables whose lines do not cross the vertical dashed line have a 
significant relationship predicting far-right populist sentiment.  Variables whose entire confidence levels 
fall to the right of the dashed line have a positive relationship and to the left are negative.  See Table 2 in 
Appendix A for Figure 3 regression table. 
 










The last variable in Figure 3 measures conspiratorial thinking.  Beliefs that a 
laboratory manufactured COVID-19 have the strongest relationship with far-right 
populist sentiment out of all the independent variables in Figure 3.  This revelation ties 
closely to previous works that make similar claims (Bergmann 2018; Eberl, Huber, and 
Greussing 2020; Oliver and Rahn 2016, 198; Oliver and Wood 2014; Georgiou, 
Delfabbro, and Balzan 2020).  In conjunction with the results from the first analysis, this 
study supports the findings of Georgiou, Delfabbro, and Balzan (2020) who also 
determined that COVID-19 conspiracy theories were positively related to individuals 
who also held broader conspiratorial beliefs, had less education, and had more negative 
attitudes towards government responses to the global pandemic.   
4.3 Individual-level analysis using emotional state variables 
Figure 4 depicts the third statistical analysis that investigates how self-reported 
emotional states relate to far-right populist sentiment.  Of the 11 independent variables, 
only two have significant relationships with the dependent variable:  feelings of 
hopelessness and pride.  The ANES survey asked these emotional state questions before 
the 2020 election.  The first independent variable in Figure 4 measures how hopeful 
survey respondents felt about the country’s current situation.  The strong, negative 
relationship suggests that feelings of hopelessness have a significant relationship with 
far-right populists.  Hope is associated with potential, possibility, and the future 
(Cavanaugh et al. 2011, 39), whereas, hopelessness sees the future as bleak or uncertain.  
Figure 2 suggests that far-right populists thought the country was on the right track in 
2020, however, seemingly contradicting the results in Figure 4.  It is important to note 
that the survey question in Figure 2 asked about the current state of the county instead of 
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the future state.  The delineation is important when understanding populist hope and 
attitude towards the future.  Although this study is unable to find any corroborating 
research on the relationship between hope and populism, other studies have linked 
feelings of stress, anxiety, and economic insecurity to conspiratorial thinking.  
Furthermore, this study also demonstrates that beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracies have a 
significant relationship with far-right populism (Grzesiak-Feldman 2013; Oliver and 
Rahn 2016; Jay et al. 2019; Bergmann 2018).   
Figure 4. ANES 2020 Emotional Variables at 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Source: 2020 American National Election Study Time-Series Data 
Note:  The color lines represent each variable’s 95% confidence level.  The shape represents the median 
value.  Variables whose lines do not cross the vertical dashed line have a significant relationship 
predicting far-right populist sentiment.  Variables whose entire confidence levels fall to the right of the 
dashed line have a positive relationship and to the left are negative.  See Table 3 in Appendix A for 
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How proud respondents feel about the current state of the country also has a 
significant relationship with far-right populism.  Feeling proud is often associated with 
concepts like achievement, fulfillment, and the past (Cavanaugh et al. 2011, 39).  
Therefore, this analysis finds that far right populists likely hold negative or uncertain 
views about the future while holding a favorable view of the past and a sense of 
achievement.  In this context, President Trump’s 2016 campaign slogan of “Make 
America Great Again” likely resonated with far-right populists because it exploited their 
feelings of patriotism and nationalism. 
4.4 State-level analysis of COVID-19 NPI on anxiety and depression 
The fourth statistical analysis is at an aggregate level measuring the effect state 
NPI measures have on resident’s self-reported levels of anxiety or depression.  Figure 5 
depicts the box and whisker plots for each NPI going from “No Restrictions” to 
“Lockdown.”  The median value for all three NPI measures is around 37%.   
Further analysis suggests a relationship between “Some Restrictions” and the 
percentage of the population self-reporting symptoms of anxiety or depression disorder.  
In a generalized linear model, states with NPI measures that mandated mask wear but 
also opened other social activities like dining outdoors have a significant relationship 
with decreasing feelings of anxiety or depression at the 95% Confidence Level.  States 
that loosen COVID-19 lockdown measures by opening some social activities while still 
requiring masks, decrease feelings of anxiety and depression created during the 
pandemic.  A Pearson’s Chi-squared test also suggests the relationship is significant (x2 = 
653.9, df = 440, p-value = 1.54e-10).  To be clear, this analysis suggests a relationship 
does exist between state government responses to COVID-19 and the mental health of 
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citizens; however, this analysis does not include any other independent variables and 
therefore should be considered with caution.  Further analysis at the state-level could 
investigate this relationship further and better inform government officials when making 
decisions during public health and safety crises. 
Figure 5.  Non-Pharm Intervention on Anxiety and Depression 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey 2020 & The New York Times 
Note:  The solid black line is the median value with the blue shaded area encompassing the lower and 
upper quartiles.  The “whiskers” depict the minimum and maximum values that are within plus or minus 
1.5 times the quartile range box.  Points beyond the “whiskers” are outliers. 
Note:  See Appendix A Table 4 for a regression table of the analysis 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study addresses how the COVID-19 pandemic affects far-right populist 
sentiment among American citizens.  With the understanding that few people will self-
identify as a populist due to its assumed negative connotation, this study generates a 





































composite, dependent variable encompassing attributes the current literature associates 
with far-right populism.  This research then takes four different approaches to analyze 
many predicting conditions like beliefs about COVID-19, feelings towards state 
government responses to the virus, and other factors associated with the composite, 
dependent variable. 
A comparison between 2016 and 2020 identifies several factors associated far-
right populist sentiment.  The perception that the country was going on the wrong track in 
2016 had a strong positive relationship whereas the opposite is true in 2020.  An omitted 
variable from this analysis, chiefly the party leading the executive branch of government, 
likely contributes to the results polarity.  Additionally, other variables like lower 
education, concerns that economic mobility has worsened over the last two decades and 
beliefs in a strong leader in the White House are all strongly associated with far-right 
populist sentiment.   
Using survey questions exclusive to 2020, logit regression indicates other 
variables strongly associated with the composite, dependent variable.  Attitudes that 
COVID-19 government responses are too strict are only associated with the dependent 
variable when no other independent variables are included in the regression.  With their 
addition, participation in online political activity and attitudes that social protests through 
the summer of 2020 were mostly violent rather than peaceful also have a strong 
association with the dependent variable.  The strongest of these is conspiratorial beliefs 
that a laboratory manufactured COVID-19.  Here, this study contributes to the growing 
literature linking conspiracy theories to the far-right (Georgiou, Delfabbro, and Balzan 
2020; Oliver and Wood 2014; Eberl, Huber, and Greussing 2020; Bergmann 2018). 
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An analysis of individuals’ emotional states suggest that hopelessness and pride 
are strongly, albeit inversely, associated with far-right populism.  This study makes a 
novel assertion that hopelessness is strongly associated with predicting far-right 
populism.  Hopelessness is associated with feelings of the future suggesting that populists 
hold negative views of what the future holds for them.  Alternatively, pride is associated 
with the past, including feelings of accomplishment, and is strongly associated with 
predicting far-right populism.  The dichotomy of these emotional feelings correspond to 
conservative apprehension towards social progress and admiration for past 
accomplishments. 
Lastly, a state-level analysis compares government responses to COVID-19 and 
residents’ self-reported feelings of anxiety and depression.  Initial results suggest that 
loosening lockdown measures, opening some social activities while still enforcing mask 
mandates improved the mental health of citizens.  Unfortunately, there is low confidence 
in this assessment due to a lack of other independent variables thereby necessitating 
further analysis to draw a stronger conclusion.   
In summation, many factors influence far-right populism in the U.S. Although the 
relationship between feelings of anxiety and depression with state NPI measures remains 
inconclusive, the Household Pulse Survey suggests that the pandemic affected the mental 
state of American citizens.  Those who felt hopeless as a result had a stronger proclivity 
towards far-right populism.  In this sense, one might ascertain that hope in the face of 
adversity and threat can help fight extreme sentiment.    
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Table 1. Comparison Between 2016 and 2020  
 2016 2020 
COVID-19  0.15 
  (0.11) 
Country on Wrong Track 0.53 ** -0.45 *** 
 (0.19) (0.11) 
Extremely Liberal -1.70 * -0.77 * 
 (0.73) (0.38) 
Liberal -1.82 *** -1.50 *** 
 (0.43) (0.32) 
Slightly Liberal -1.20 ** -1.08 *** 
 (0.36) (0.29) 
Moderate -0.30 -0.59 ** 
 (0.19) (0.18) 
Slightly Conservative -0.11 -0.28 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Conservative 0.51 ** 0.45 ** 
 (0.18) (0.16) 
Extremely Conservative 1.17 *** 1.00 *** 
 (0.24) (0.19) 
High School or Less Education 0.48 *** 0.35 ** 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
Uses Internet at Home -0.14 -0.05 
 (0.18) (0.25) 
Economic Mobility has Worsened 0.65 *** 0.47 *** 
 (0.15) (0.11) 
Years Lived in Community 0.04 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
Worry About Finances 0.90 *** 0.19 
 (0.18) (0.11) 
Believes in Strong Leader 0.76 *** 1.03 *** 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Supports Political Violence 0.16 0.01 
 (0.17) (0.16) 
N 3937 8280 
AIC 1973.64 2996.45 
BIC 2074.09 3115.82 
Pseudo-R2 0.17 0.15 
Note: All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  AIC is the Akaike’s Information Criterion and BIC is Bayesian Information Criterion 
where lower numbers are preferred.  *** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05. 
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Table 2.  Variables Unique to ANES 2020 Dataset  
 Model 1 Model 2 
COVID-19 Too Strict 0.81 *** 0.06 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
Protests Deemed Violent  1.05 *** 
  (0.11) 
Online Political Activity  0.44 ** 
  (0.15) 
Posted Political Activity  0.19 
  (0.11) 
Thought COVID Made in a Lab  1.57 *** 
  (0.13) 
N 8280 8280 
AIC 3338.90 2977.56 
BIC 3352.95 3019.69 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.15 
Note: All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard 
deviation. Standard errors in parentheses.  AIC is the Akaike’s Information 
Criterion and BIC is Bayesian Information Criterion where lower numbers are 
preferred.  *** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05. 
 
Table 3.  Emotional State Variables  
 Model 1 


















Trouble Concentrating -0.17 
 (0.11) 





Pseudo R2 0.04 
Note: All continuous predictors are mean-
centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation.   
*** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05. 
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Table 4. NPI Affect on Anxiety and Depression 
 Model 1 
(Intercept) 37.55 *** 
 (0.17) 







Pseudo R2 0.00 
Note:  All continuous predictors are mean-
centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation.  
*** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05. 
 
